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SUMMARY
This article looks at the issue of sustaining funding for a public programme through the case
study of the delivery exemptions policy in Ghana. The Government of Ghana introduced the
policy of exempting users from delivery fees in September 2003 in the four most deprived
regions of the country, and in April 2005 it was extended to the remaining six regions in Ghana.
The aim of the policy of free delivery care was to reduce ﬁnancial barriers to using maternity
services. Using materials from key informant interviews at national and local levels in 2005,
the article examines how the policy has been implemented and what the main constraints have
been, as perceived by different actors in the health system. The interviews show that despite
being a high-proﬁle public policy and achieving positive results, the delivery exemptions
policy quickly ran into implementation problems caused by inadequate funding. They suggest
that facility and district managers bear the brunt of the damage that is caused when beneﬁts that
have been promised to the public cannot be delivered. There can be knock-on effects on other
public programmes too.
Despite these problems, start-stop funding and under-funding of public programmes is more
the norm than the exception. Some of the factors causing erratic funding—such as party
politics and intersectoral haggling over resources—are unavoidable, but others, such as
communication and management failures can and should be addressed. Copyright # 2007
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
Sustainability has long been a mantra in development circles, but public funding for
programmes is insecure, both in developing countries and in the West. In Britain, for
example the current government is criticized for starting a plethora of initiatives
without adequate follow-through. The syndrome of starting programmes without
planning for their long-term ﬁnancial viability is not, therefore, conﬁned to
low-income countries, but is more acute in the context of very limited public funds.
This article looks at the issue of sustaining funding for a public programme
through the case study of the delivery exemptions policy that was introduced in
Ghana in 2003. Using materials from key informant interviews, it examines why this
‘short-termism’ occurs and the impact that it has on different actors in the health
system. The themes that are drawn out here are likely to be of wider international
relevance.
BACKGROUND
The Government of Ghana introduced the policy of exempting users from delivery
fees in September 2003 in the four most deprived regions of the country, and in April
2005 it was extended to the remaining six regions in Ghana. The aim of the policy of
free delivery care was to reduce the ﬁnancial barriers to using maternity services. It
was expected that this would lead to a reduction in maternal and perinatal mortality,
as well as contributing to poverty reduction (Ministry of Health, 2004a).
One of the Millenium Development Goals is to reduce maternal mortality by
three-quarters by 2015 (http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/). So far, relatively little
progress has been made, and donors and governments are looking for cost-effective
and sustainable approaches which can reduce maternal mortality. One of the main
challenges here is increasing the proportion of women who deliver with a skilled
attendant. This is a key component of the Safe Motherhood Initiative (http://
www.safemotherhood.org/). Ghana has a persistently high maternal mortality rate
and growing social inequalities, with rates of skilled attendance either stagnant or
declining for poorer women (Graham, 2004). While ﬁnancial barriers are only one of
the constraints to seeking skilled care during deliveries, they are believed to be one of
the most important factors (UNFPA/MoH, 2004).
The exemptions policy was funded through the Highly Indebted Poor Country
(HIPC) debt relief funds, which were channelled to the districts1 to reimburse
facilities—both public and private—according to the number of deliveries that they
performed each month. A tariff was approved by the Ministry of Health that set
reimbursement rates according to the type of delivery (such as ‘normal’, ‘assisted
delivery’ or ‘caesarean section’) and the facility type (mission and private facilities
are reimbursed at a higher rate, in recognition of the fact that they are not in receipt of
1The local political authority was used at ﬁrst but later funds were transferred through the Ghana Health
Service.
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public subsidies) (Ministry of Health, 2004a). Apart from the costs of reaching
facilities, women are supposed to face no direct costs for their deliveries.
Initiative for Maternal Mortality Programme Assessment (IMMPACT) is a global
research initiative that seeks to strengthen the evidence base for policy decision-
makers on cost-effective intervention strategies to reduce maternal mortality.
IMMPACT has been working in partnership with local stakeholders to identify and
evaluate strategies with potential to signiﬁcantly reduce maternal and perinatal
mortality. In Ghana, the government policy of providing free deliveries for all
women was selected for evaluation. The aim of the overall IMMPACT evaluation
was to assess how the free delivery policy has affected utilization, quality of services
and health and non-health outcomes for households (especially poorer households)
(Noguchi Institute and IMMPACT, 2005).
METHODS
This article is based on the ﬁrst stage of IMMPACT research, in which key informant
interviews were conducted in Central and Volta Regions and at national level in
October and November 2005 (Witter et al., 2005). The study is a qualitative one
using an in-depth method of interview. The aim was to establish the state of
implementation of the exemption policy for deliveries and to seek the views of some
key stakeholders. This would inform the next stage of the evaluation research.
The regions were chosen to reﬂect the experiences of the ﬁrst regions to join the
delivery exemption scheme (Central) and that of the more recent wave (Volta).
Within each region, six focus districts were chosen, matched for characteristics such
as population size, poverty status, urban proﬁle and health infrastructure (Noguchi
Institute and IMMPACT, 2005).
The 65 key informants were chosen purposively based on their roles and level of
the health system at which they operate (see Table 1). They included national
policy-makers, representatives of regional and district health authorities, repre-
sentatives of the District Assemblies through which the funds had been channelled
(in Central Region), and a sample of facility heads. The facilities were selected to
represent each of the six focus districts and also to cover a range of types of facilities.
A team of four researchers carried out the interviews using an open-ended question
check list. The questions were varied by level of interviewee. At the national level,
the focus was on perceptions of the programme, its successes and failures,
implementation issues, allocation of resources, disbursement mechanisms, sustain-
ability and future funding options, degree of priority which the programme should
receive, impact on services and staff, interaction with health insurance in future and
suggestions for future changes.
At regional level, these questions were supplemented with more detailed probing
about the process of establishing the programme, how it is currently being
implemented, the adequacy of funding, degree of dissemination in the community
and impact on quality of services.
At district and facility levels, questions were added about dates of operation,
whether patients were making contributions of any kind, delays in funding, whether
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funding is ring-fenced, appropriateness of reimbursement tariffs, how it has affected
defaulter and referral rates, whether reimbursement covers loss of user fee income,
whether revenue is shared with staff in facilities, impact on private midwives and
traditional birth attendants, how cumbersome the scheme is to manage and other
programmes in the district which might affect supervised delivery rates.
The responses were analyzed by topic, level and region and presented, initially in
an internal report for IMMPACT (Witter et al., 2005) and then in a policy brief (PHS
work programme, 2005).
MAIN FINDINGS
In Central Region, the policy had been in place for just under 2 years, whereas in
Volta, it had only been operational for 6 months. In both cases, implementation had
been fairly smooth, and key informants were positive about the policy, seeing it as an
effective approach to an important problem.
‘It was the right policy. It was good to exempt deliveries’ (national KI)
Utilization was reported to have risen by between 20% and 500% in different
facilities and facility managers reported that women were presenting earlier and that
they were, therefore, better able to manage any complications. They perceived the
policy to have had a positive effect on maternal mortality and other indicators, such
as postnatal coverage.
‘Was it successful? It did raise supervised delivery coverage’ (national KI)
Table 1. Summary of key informants
Level Category Number
National level KI Ministry of Health 3
Ghana Health Service 3
Donors 2
Mission sector 1
Regional KI Regional directors of health services,
deputies and Senior Medical Ofﬁcers
4
Regional hospital directors and administrators 2
Regional accountants 1
TOTAL 7
District KI District Director of Health Services
and senior public health staff
17
District Assembly staff and accountants 16
TOTAL 33
Facility KI In-charges, matrons and senior facility staff 16
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In Central Region, quality was reported to have improved as a result of the policy,
mainly because funds were received regularly and in bulk, which from a facility
perspective was far preferable to chasing individual women for payment and having
to accept a certain proportion of defaulters. When the programme was funded, it
improved the availability of funds for drugs and supplies. In Volta, the short life of the
programme so far meant that no change in quality was noted.
The main constraint, and one which was causing a crisis of conﬁdence in the
policy, was the shortfall and unpredictability of funding.
‘The exemption scheme was a politician’s whim, to please the people, with no
thought for sustainability’ (district KI)
‘Thewhole design was poor from the beginning: they didn’t ask the regions how
much they needed. We in the region developed our own criteria, based on past
utilisation, but we have never received any funds since then’ (regional KI)
However the argument from the Ministry of Health’s perspective is that when they
started the programme they had every reason to believe that HIPC funds would
continue to be available to fund the programme.
Why didn’t we foresee these problems? We were optimistic and there was a
strong political element. HIPC funds were there, and the donors were eager. At
that time, there was no sense of resource constraints’ (national KI)
‘It is now threatened by the ﬂow of funds and adverse changes in the ﬁnancial
environment’ (National level KI)
In Central Region, the ﬁrst funds were received from the District Assemblies in
early 2004. It was not clear how long the funds were supposed to last or when the next
allocation would come. Districts started to run out of funds to reimburse facilities
towards the end of the year, but managed to continue the scheme until the second
instalment in February 2005, which arrived via the Ghana Health Service. This time,
funds ran out more quickly as there were already outstanding debts to facilities to be
repaid. By mid-year, some districts had exhausted the funds and were starting to
charge clients again. At the time of the key informant interviews, in October, three of
the districts visited had run out of funds in the previous few months, and the other
three were on the verge of running out.
In Volta, the experience was shorter, but similar. The delivery exemptions had
started in April–June 2005, but funds had already run out in the majority of districts
by October, and managers were again unsure of whether or when they would get any
more. At the time of the interviews, staff reported that deliveries were still free, but it
would not be surprising if some facilities had started to charge again, given the
irregularity of reimbursement, as reported by them.
‘It is a laudable policy, but our credibility is on the line. If you are going to start
it, only to stop on the way, then the earlier you stop it, the better’ (district KI)
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Rough calculations suggest that the funding which was received was adequate for
6 months, but only one allocation was received in the whole year. Finance ofﬁcers at
the national level must have known that allocations would not be adequate.
‘The national level pretends it doesn’t know that the lower levels are in trouble,
as it doesn’t have any additional funding’ (donor KI)
This was having negative effects at all levels of the system. Patients, having been
told they would receive free services, were angry when they are asked to pay, and
suspected staff of misusing the funds whilst staff in facilities wondered if the funds
had been siphoned off higher up the system.
‘It is difﬁcult to charge now, as people will think you are cheating them. But
what do I do when I have no drugs left?’ (facility KI)
Facility managers worried about the build up of debts (deliveries are costly and
used to provide substantial revenue for the facilities).
‘My only problem is getting money for services rendered’ (facility KI)
District staff were trying to keep the facilities happy, while hoping that further
funds or even communication about funds would come. Regional directors were
writing letters to the national level, requesting further funds, but were in the dark as to
whether any would arrive. Debts to medical stores were building up.
The conﬁdence of the private and mission providers in government schemes was
reported to be eroding, which may also affect future schemes, such as health
insurance.
‘Health insurance is facing similar problems to exemptions. The local levels are
struggling to make it real, without any proper support from the national level’
(donor KI)
General cynicism was growing, particularly given that this came on top of
on-going problems with other exemptions schemes, such as under-5s and ante-natal
care, which were heavily in arrears and had been problematic for years (Garshong
et al., 2001).
‘It can end up like the other policies, whereby the ﬁrst two or three chunks of
money come, and later it takes years’ (facility KI)
DISCUSSION
The delivery exemptions programme was a high-proﬁle national programme, which
had raised the expectations of the public and the donor community. The fact that it
was selected for evaluation by IMMPACT shows the importance attached to it by
government stakeholders too. Why then was it allowed to run out of funds (or at
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minimum—if funding resumes—to face inadequate and uneven funding) after such
a short life-span? After all, most stakeholders would agree that the goal of reducing
maternal mortality is one that requires a long-term effort. Five main explanatory
factors are suggested below, based on the context in Ghana, but common in many
other environments too.
Unpredictable ﬁnancial environment
The general problem facing policy makers in many countries is that the ﬁnancial
environment is unstable and unpredictable, and ﬂexible money for new activities is
rare. Although common basket funders provide a more predictable source of donor
funding, most of this is committed to core health system activities, and so cannot be
reallocated. Non-basket donors are less predictable and make commitments that they
often do not keep. It is estimated that the Government of Ghana gets an average of
60% of committed aid (MOH, 1999). Planning services in this environment is not
easy.
In this case, the HIPC fund allocations, which are controlled by the Ministry of
Finance, were cut for the health sector in 2005, partly because contributions from
formal sector workers for the National Health Insurance fund were beginning to build
up, and the health sector was, therefore, not seen as a priority for additional
resources. (These funds are earmarked though, and so do not represent ﬂexible funds
that can be used by the Ministry.)
Competing policies
It is also common for competing policies to be established more or less at the same
time, partly because of uncertainty about their timing and success rate. An example
of this is the timing of the delivery exemption policy, which has been introduced
alongside the development of national health insurance in Ghana. The aim of NHI
was to provide cover for all services currently provided by public facilities in Ghana,
including delivery care. Once established and successful, there would be no need for
both policies.
However, NHI takes a long time to establish—it was initiated originally in 2002
(Ministry of Health, 2004b) and has only just been launched formally, late in 2005.
Coverage is still low—an estimated 15–20% nationally. While it is being developed,
delivery exemptions are still needed as an important source of ﬁnancial relief for
women and their households. However, funding for the policy has been undermined
by unrealistic expectations of the arrival and widespread coverage of health
insurance. It is hard to argue for budget allocations for delivery exemptions when
each year there is an expectation that health insurance will ﬁnally materialize and
take over the burden of providing coverage for the poor.
Different interests and perspectives
It became clear in the key informant interviews that ofﬁcials at different levels of the
health system have very different perspectives and face different incentives.
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At national level, policy-makers have an incentive to come up with new initiatives
that will generate public approval for the government and will attract donor interest
and funding. They are, therefore, innovators and risk-takers by trade, rather than
having to worry about practical implementation issues, which are generally mufﬂed
at grassroots level by the poor communication up and down the hierarchy.
District managers and facility in-charges are on the whole more conservative, as
they face the practical costs of failure. They have a more hard-headed view, based on
experiences of broken promises.
From the top, there is a cynicism about the entrepreneurial behaviour of facility
managers. They are seen as proﬁt-maximizers, raking in subsidies and user fee
income (‘internally generated funds’, as they are called in Ghana) and other funding,
such as for the free delivery programme, while failing to make sacriﬁces for pro-poor
public policies.
At lower levels, there is jealousy of national ofﬁcials, who are seen as prime
beneﬁciaries of such resources as are available, in terms of funds and knowledge.
Communication and management failures
Researchers found that health staff at regional, district and facility levels were
completely uninformed about the ﬂow of resources for this programme, which made
it hard for them to make appropriate decisions. If there are funding problems at
national level, they should be informed. Similarly, they need to be informed how long
funds are expected to last, so that they can manage them appropriately. Managers
were also unaware of how the programme was expected to dovetail with the new
health insurance programme, due to be launched at the end of 2005. In this respect,
the situation at regional level does not appear to have improved since 1992, when a
study concluded that ‘management at regional, district and facility level worked in a
highly constrained environment of uncertainty, mistrust, limited power and
frustration’ (Waddington, 1992).
If information is not ﬂowing down reliably, it is also not ﬂowing up. Managers at
regional level and abovewere not aware of the ﬁnancial state of the programme—for
example, whether districts were still holding funds and able to make reimbursements
for deliveries or not. This kind of information should be routine monitoring data, but
the familiar combination of poor systems, overburdened staff, fragmented
programmes and lack of funds for transport mean that mangers have to rely on
externally funded evaluations to provide them with basic information, such as
whether a programme is fully operational or not. This contributes to erratic
programming.
Even horizontal information ﬂows have been problematic. Better communication
between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance might have been able to
identify some sources of additional funds to rescue the programme in mid-year.
Similarly, donors have expressed surprise that they were not approached by the
Ministry with requests for additional funds for a programme on which they had
placed a high emphasis.
Although national guidelines were issued in 2004 for the delivery exemptions,
there was no written plan for how long the programme would continue, how much it
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would cost or where the funds would come from. Similarly, although the guidelines
included a demand for regular reporting from the districts, there has been very little
support or supervision of implementation, and at the national level, there is no data
available about how the policy has been interpreted, how funds have been disbursed,
and how many deliveries have been exempted.
Multiple agencies: the ‘no blame game’
In Ghana, as in most countries, there are many organisations involved in the health
system and many channels of funding, which fudges the lines of responsibility for a
particular programme and reduces the likelihood of it being closely supervised and
managed. Each agency can blame the other and not take direct responsibility. For
example, the Ministry of Health can blame the Ministry of Finance for not releasing
enough money. The mission sector can blame the Ministry of Health for not
informing it of the release of funds and how they were to be used. The Ghana Health
Service can blame the district assemblies for sitting on funds. If district mutual health
insurance organisations take over the operation of exemptions, as is currently under
discussion, then much of the blame will no doubt be deﬂected onto them.
While there is much literature on deﬁning, measuring and evaluating sustainability
(LaFond, 1995, for example), and on general underlying factors such as health
ﬁnancing trends (World Bank, 2006), there are few studies which consider why
individual programmes are sustained or not and the effects of intermittent and
unpredictable funding. The Ghana case study demonstrates that what is irrational
from a societal point of view can arise from the rational interests of different actors in
the system as well as from organisational culture.
CONCLUSIONS
The key informant interviews suggest that the free delivery policy in Ghana was not
just ‘a politician’s whim’. It was an appropriate response to the low supervised
delivery rates and high maternal mortality in Ghana, and one which commanded
support from communities and health staff. Despite that, it has run into serious
implementation problems due to inadequate funding. The funding problems reﬂect
real resource constraints, but also avoidable management failures.
Although this is only one case study, the situation that is described here is familiar
to policy-makers in many developing countries and to a lesser extent in developed
countries too. It is so common for initiatives to start and then stop when funding is
removed that this situation is regarded as normal. However, the result of the factors
described here is highly sub-optimal policy-making. The start-up costs and the loss
of government credibility when a high-proﬁle public programme ‘fails’ mean that it
is not sensible to start a programme which may only have funding for a short period.
The costs of starting and abruptly stopping implementation are very real at the local
level, and in terms of ‘social capital’, and national level decision-makers should
recognise this.
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Where these factors can be tackled, that should be a priority. For example, there
have already been a number of changes to the way that aid is delivered which
increase its predictability and usability for governments (Foster et al., 2000). These
should be extended. Similarly, longer-term budgeting has been introduced into many
national planning exercises, and this should be used to develop realistic funding
plans for new ventures. The issue of competing policies is linked to some extent with
unpredictable ﬁnancing: it is rational, if you are not sure how different ‘pots’ of
money will progress, to bid for activities funded from different sources, so that some
at least will survive. Improving ﬁnancial planning and predictability should reduce
conﬂicting policies. Improved communication within the health system would also
help greatly in allowing feedback to policy-makers and the ﬁne-tuning of policies.
Management systems for supervising and monitoring implementation can be
simpliﬁed and strengthened, with clearer lines of responsibility laid down for
tracking the progress of new initiatives.
Some things never change—party politics, unforeseen circumstances and
haggling between sectoral priorities, for example, cannot be abolished, nor is it
unnatural that stakeholders at different levels face different pressures and play
different roles. However, some of the factors favouring instability can and should be
mitigated. An active media can also play its role in following up on some of the
high-proﬁle initiatives that politicians launch and then forget.
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